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Why Law Matters for Our Obligations
Guyora Binder∗ 
Abstract
Political philosophers have long debated the problem of political and legal obligation:
how the existence of a political community and its laws can affect our obligations. This 
paper applies Alon Harel’s argument that law has intrinsic value to this venerable problem.
It interprets Harel’s argument as a Kantian claim that law enables us to treat our fellows
with the respect they deserve, by requiring us not only to treat them decently, but to
recognize decent treatment as their right. 
I. Introduction 
Authority is often presented as a defining feature of law in both positivist and naturalist
accounts. Yet some moral philosophers deny that such authority can be justified. As Rob-
ert Paul Wolff famously put it, “[T]he defining mark of the state is authority, the right to
rule,” while “the primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled.”1 On this
view, we might have moral reasons to do as law commands, but the fact that law com-
mands cannot be one of them. Law might be a useful instrument for motivating people to
fulfill their moral duties, but it cannot change what those duties are. A. John Simmons
argues that even if particular laws are useful to achieving moral aims, they cannot be ob-
ligatory unless those moral aims could be achieved in no other way.2 
Recently, some legal theorists have made arguments like Wolff’s and Simmons’s in
denying that law has authority or needs to claim it.
In Against Obligation, Abner Greene critiques a wide range of arguments for an ob-
ligation to obey law.3 He rejects arguments based on consent as requiring conditions of
free choice that do not and cannot obtain. He adds that even those who feel bound to
obey law may feel competing duties to obey other authorities, such as religious communi-
ties. He rejects arguments that fulfillment of certain criteria of justice or political
legitimacy can ground an obligation to obey law, reasoning that few actual legal systems
meet these high standards. Hence, law should not present its commands as preemptive
reasons for action and does not merit obedience when it does so.
∗ SUNY Distinguished Professor and Hodgson Russ Scholar, State University of New York at Buffalo Law 
School. Thanks are due Alon Harel, Vera Bergelson, Michael Cahill, Adil Haque, Kyron Huigens, Youngjae
Lee, Alice Ristroph, Malcolm Thorburn, Ekow Yankah, Leo Zaibert and Douglas Husak.
1 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism 18 (1976).
2 A. John Simmons, The Duty to Obey Law and Our Natural Moral Duties, in Is There a Duty to Obey
Law? 93, 188, 194-95 (A. John Simmons & Christopher Health Wellman eds., 2005).
3 Abner Greene, Against Obligation: The Multiple Sources of Authority in a Liberal Democracy 35-113 (2012).
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269Binder — Why Law Matters
In Law’s Evolution and Human Understanding, Laurence Claus challenges both the
descriptive accuracy and the normative appeal of the conception of law as a body of
norms followed out of a sense of obligation.4 Claus argues that the idea of legal authority
grew out of illiberal practices of submitting to the personal authority of rulers that were
incompatible with modern notions of autonomy and equality. He adds that even in liberal
societies with stable governments and social orders, there are widespread patterns of non-
compliance and nonenforcement. Even in the modern liberal state, he concludes, social
order is more a product of custom than of law. Not only does Claus deny that anyone has
an obligation to obey law, he doubts that many people feel such an obligation. On this
basis, he denies that law’s effectuality could depend on the prevalence of such a feeling,
and so he denies that law need demand it. If authority plays no necessary role in a concept
of law, law is better conceived as a useful system of predictions sometimes enforced by
coercion, but followed only out of self-interest.
In this context of skepticism about the authority of law, Alon Harel’s new book
Why Law Matters 5 sounds a dissenting note. Harel argues, in the Kantian tradition, that a
number of legal institutions—rights, states, offices, constitutions and judicial review— 
have intrinsic rather than instrumental value, because they enable societies to confer a
dignitary status on individuals that would not otherwise be possible. In making these ar-
guments, Harel takes no explicit position on the problem of legal authority. Yet Kant
certainly saw law as authoritative. He saw each of us as having a moral duty not only to
refrain from injuring one another, but to subject ourselves to a rule of law forbidding
such injury. In so doing, we would endow our fellows with security and dignity by trans-
forming their interests into entitlements.6 Harel’s claim that law has intrinsic value makes
sense of Kant’s idea that we have a moral duty not only to treat our fellows fairly but also
to treat them justly—that is, to treat them fairly under law. In this way, Harel’s book
shows how law can have the authority to obligate compliance.
II. Law’s Intrinsic Value 
Harel modestly disclaims a central thesis or method of argument.7 Yet throughout the
work he treats law as a medium for expressing public value judgments about the worth of
persons. We often think of laws as having instrumental value in the sense of producing
welfare gains, as by deterring crime, or conserving common resources. Harel calls atten-
tion to the expressive value of legal institutions, irrespective of their welfare effects. The
gist of this argument is that rights, the state, offices, constitutions and judicial review are
each necessary to confer a distinctive kind of dignity on individuals.
4 Laurence Claus, Law’s Evolution and Human Understanding 38-45 (2012).
5 Alon Harel, Why Law Matters (2014).
6 Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory, Moral or Political?, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 321, 358-66 (2002).

















   
   
 
 


















270 Critical Analysis of Law 2:2 (2015)
The state is an entity that can speak for the political community as a whole. Thus,
it has a distinctive role in expressing public judgments of value. This is particularly appar-
ent in the context of criminal punishment. Punishment is often explained and justified as
a deterrent to antisocial behavior, but private revenge can have this effect as well. Yet pri-
vate revenge and public punishment diverge in function when we consider their 
respective meanings. To be sure, revenge conveys that the victim and his associates de-
nounce the previous attack as wrongful, refuse to accept its implicit disparagement of the
victim’s dignity and worth, and perhaps disrespect the perpetrator. Public punishment
expresses many of these same evaluations, but it adds authoritative weight to them by ex-
pressing them on behalf of the entire political community. Thus it resolves the debate
about the right or wrong of the initial attack and the relative worth of perpetrator and vic-
tim. Rather than contestably asserting the honor of the victim, it authoritatively
reestablishes the victim’s dignity.8 Harel implies that while both public and private actors
can deter, only the state can achieve retributive justice by denouncing the act and vindicat-
ing the victim in the name of the political community as a whole.9 
Here we might question whether the contribution the state makes to retributive
justice is exclusively intrinsic rather than instrumental. Perhaps what the victim cares
about is not his civic status, but his social status; and that public punishment helps restore
his damaged social status by coordinating the judgments of individual members of society.
If so, we might say that public denunciation not only expresses the political community’s
collective denunciation of the offense and vindication of the victim, but also evokes such 
denunciation and vindication on the part of its members. If public punishment operates
in this way, it is both intrinsically retributive and also an instrument of retributive justice.
Assuming retributive punishment both expresses public judgment and mobilizes collective
judgment, a duty to achieve retributive justice would oblige citizens not only to institute
public punishment of wrongdoing, but also to join the state in denouncing wrongdoing
and according respect to victims. In other words, by punishing in the name of a political
community, the state not only honors individuals in a distinctive way, it also enables
individuals to honor each other in a distinctive way.
If the state has significance as the agent of the public, officials have significance as
agents of the state. In executing the state’s directives, officials give the state voice and
clothe their own actions in public meaning. In order for official action to convey this
message, it must be rigidly constrained by procedural routines.10 This requisite quality of
officiousness shows the act is not an exercise of discretion expressing the values and prefer-
8 For arguments along these lines, see Jean Hampton, The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in
Moral and Political Philosophy 108-50 (1st ed. 2007); Guyora Binder, Victims and the Significance of
Causing Harm, 28 Pace L. Rev. 713, 719-28 (2008); Guyora Binder, Authority to Proscribe and Punish
International Crimes, 63 U. Toronto L.J. 278, 287-91 (2013).
9 Harel, supra note 5, at 70-82, 96-99.
10 Id. at 87-95.








   
  





   
  





     
 
  
    
  
  





    
 
271Binder — Why Law Matters
ences of the official himself, but is instead an application of law. Officiousness also con-
veys something important about how the law treats individuals. It treats them according 
to impartial rules, rather than making them means to ends.
The most important way that law conveys the worth of individuals, however, is by
conferring rights. The capacity of others to benefit—or harm—us gives them power over
us. Rights secure us against domination by binding others to benefit us, or to refrain from
injuring us.11 The state can advance welfare by providing services, or by stimulating em-
ployment, or treating injury, but it serves additional purposes by treating any of these
benefits as rights. When a person possesses an entitlement to a good, he has not just the
use of the good, but security in that use. Where cost-benefit analysis can trade one per-
son’s welfare off against another’s, rights typically cannot be traded off in this way, at least
not without the consent of the holder or the giving of certain kinds of reasons. Thus, a
right changes the way other actors must reason about how they affect us, and may create
grounds for us to contest their actions. Drawing on Rousseau and other republican theo-
rists, Harel argues that these protections change our status from dependent to free.12 
Constitutions can further entrench rights, securing them against legislative action
as well as private violation.13 Finally, judicial review offers not just a means of enforcing
constitutional rights, but an opportunity for holders of rights to be heard and to demand
reasons.14 Taken together, rights, constitutions, and judicial review create a process by
which the public, in the form of the state, is made answerable to individuals.
By virtue of the state and the institutional structures that constrain it, law can confer
dignity on individuals in ways that would not be possible without it. Does this oblige us to
obey law? If we add an assumption it might. Let us assume that people deserve to be treated
with the kind of dignity that only law enables. If so, law is an indispensable means of treat-
ing people as they deserve. It would seem to follow that we have a moral duty to create,
preserve and support the legal regimes necessary to treat people as they deserve. This ra-
tionale makes sense of Kant’s insistence that we have duties to obey and enforce law.15 
III. Law’s Authority in Jurisprudence 
Many people act as if they believe that obedience to law is obligatory and that enforce-
ment of law is justified. They express resentment toward those who violate their legal
entitlements, and toward government officials who fail to prevent or to redress these vio-
lations. In so doing they invoke law and justice, not just welfare or morality. Sometimes
11 Id. at 171-72.
12 Id. at 174-77.
13 Id. at 177-80.
14 Id. at 202-16.
15 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice 124-25 (2d ed. 1999); Allen D. Rosen, Kant’s Theory
of Justice 19, 119 (1965).
  
 
    
  
 
    
   
 
  







   





       
      
     
   
     
    
    
                                                 
   
      
  
   
   
  
   
  
  
272 Critical Analysis of Law 2:2 (2015)
people express disapproval of others for violating laws—for example those imposing tax-
es—they would oppose as voters. Lawyers and officials also engage in an elaborate
discourse of argument and justification that presupposes that law is binding on officials
and makes justified claims upon its subjects. When subjects are surveyed about their atti-
tudes towards law they express that laws should be obeyed, and they explain their own
compliance with law by reference to that value commitment.16 Both psychological and
historical research suggest a linkage between compliance and a favorable view of law and
legal institutions.17 
Legal theorists of widely differing views treat these patterns of talking, thinking
and acting as part of the phenomenon of law that they are trying to explain.
Legal positivist theories of law often acknowledge that law makes a claim to au-
thority. They reason that legal systems exist and have validity in so far as those subject to
them accept that claim. H.L.A. Hart distinguished laws from the commands of a gunman,
however general or regular in form. From a viewpoint internal to a legal system, a legal
claim is a normative claim about what people are obligated to do.18 For Hart, such author-
ity was a sociological fact essential for the existence of a legal system. Yet, Hart reasoned,
a legal system need not be accepted as authoritative by everyone it affects in order to have
existence and to generate valid norms. An essential feature of a law, distinguishing it from
other social norms, was its technicality: the existence of a cadre of officials following eso-
teric rules for the identification of binding norms.19 For Hart, it sufficed that these
officials acted out of a sense of obligation for their commands to be law, even if the pub-
lic followed these commands out of fear alone.20 
For Joseph Raz, “[I]t is an essential feature of law that it claims legitimate authority.”21 
A legal system is in force only where it is widely obeyed, and accepted as authoritative
by some. Raz conceives authority as a power to create “exclusionary reasons” for action
that efface competing considerations, including moral reasons.22 Indeed, he sees the very
efficacy and fairness of law as requiring this sort of normative opacity. He agrees with
Wolff that there can be no general obligation to obey law.23 Yet he argues that a moral
agent may permissibly create such a duty by committing herself to obey a particular legal
16 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 161-78 (2006). 
17 Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and
Courts 101-30 (2002); Randolph Roth, American Homicide 1-26 (2009).
18 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 54-57, 86-88 (2d ed. 1994).
19 Id. at 93-97, 106-10, 115-16.
20 Id. at 116.
21 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 30 (2d ed. 2009).
22 Id. at 3-27.
23 Id. at 233-42.
    
 
   
  
 
     
 












    









                                                 
  
  






273Binder — Why Law Matters
system,24 and he denies that to accept the authority of a legal system requires abdicating
moral autonomy.25 
Law’s authority also figures prominently in normative theories of law. Such theo-
ries often attempt to understand law as a normative practice from the perspective of its
participants. They often emphasize that law stakes a claim to authority, and reason that
from an internal perspective, the validity of law depends upon the moral validity of that
claim. On such a view, persons subject to valid law are obliged to accept its authority.
Examples of such theories are those of John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin.26 For
Finnis, a theory is always an interested account of a subject defined by human projects
and ends. A theoretical account of law therefore must incorporate both observation and 
evaluation to develop a conception of law’s function in human life. A normative theory of
law would develop criteria for its proper functioning, rather than explain when or why it
functions as it does.27 Finnis’s theoretical claim is that law’s purpose is to fairly and au-
thoritatively “coordinate action to the common purpose or common good,”28 typically by
organizing the management of common resources and the production of public goods
and by assigning individual entitlements. Authority is necessary, because consensus is im-
possible in a complex society. For Finnis, goods are not simply objects of value or desire,
but those normatively appropriate ends that are practically reasonable to pursue. Valid law
is enacted law that fulfills this function. The principles of natural law are those that make
enacted law valid and compliance with it obligatory.29 Because Finnis makes the validity of
law depend on practical judgment as to whether it fairly shares the burden of achieving
normatively appropriate common ends, he arguably makes the authority of law a product
of the exercise of moral autonomy.30 
Dworkin reasons that legal argument draws on both past institutional decisions,
and considerations of justice and prudence to urge that its audience is obliged to do some-
thing. This normativity presupposes that this entire system of legal sources and reasons
stakes a moral claim on the decision-maker. All legal argument therefore depends upon
and implicitly asserts the legitimacy of law. It thereby commits its participants to view le-
gal sources as asserting principles of justice, and to apply those sources as justifiably as
possible. From this perspective, the flaw of legal positivist accounts of law is their failure
to take the content of legal argument “seriously.”  In particular, Dworkin takes issue with
24 Id. at 233-61.
25 Id. at 25-27.
26 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 3-29 (2d ed. 1980); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 1-2, 13-
15, 49-65, 78-82, 101-13, 225-38 (1986).
27 Finnis, supra note 26, at 6-19.
28 Id. at 232.
29 Id. at 23.
30 Id. at 238-54.
  
 
   



























   
   
  
                                                 
   
   
   
   
  
274 Critical Analysis of Law 2:2 (2015)
Hart’s picture of law as a finite set of determinate rules, necessitating the exercise of dis-
cretion to resolve hard cases.31 For Dworkin, all legal argument is an effort to subject the
decision-maker to the authority of law, and yet all such argument invites the decision-
maker to participate in that authority by interpreting past decisions in their best light. To 
do justice in hard cases, the decision-maker must exercise, not discretion, but interpretive
judgment.32 
For both Finnis and Dworkin, the sources of law are not exhausted by enacted
rules. Those sources include the conscience of every actor applying law. Far from
preempting moral deliberation, the authority of law depends upon it.
IV. Arguments for Legal Obligation 
A lengthy tradition in philosophy has sought to identify the conditions for the legitimate
exercise of political authority. Of course, it is conceivable for law to be legitimately en-
forceable without anyone having a duty to obey it. Thus William Edmundson has argued
that even though legitimate law demands obedience, we owe it only non-resistance.33 
Nevertheless, philosophers have generally treated the legitimacy of law and the obligation
to obey law as correlative.
The philosophical debate over the duty to obey law is very ancient. In Plato’s The
Crito, Socrates offers several arguments for obedience to law. Two are straightforward.
Thus, he owes the law obedience because it has benefited him. It has conferred entitle-
ments upon him, protected him against violence and theft, and fostered a well-governed
community for him to live in. In addition, he has assented to the laws and procedures of
his community by remaining within it, with knowledge of its institutions.34 
Yet Socrates offers another argument based on a puzzling metaphor. He owes the
laws obedience, he says, because, like parents, they have nurtured and educated him.35 
This strange argument must be understood in light of Socrates’s conception of philoso-
phy as justificatory conversation that tests and educates the participants, thereby bringing
the ignorant under the governance of the wise. Socrates also imagines law as ideally such
an educative conversation, and law’s power as the authority of reason. The laws have nur-
tured him in the sense that his ideas about justice derive from the experience of a social
practice of submitting disputes for reasoned resolution. Thus, to object to his own death
sentence as unjustified is already to concede that his life should depend on what reasons
of justice he can offer others that he deserves to live. To assert rights and frame argu-
ments is therefore to accept the authority of law in principle, however much one might
31 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 14-80 (5th ed. 1978).
32 Id. at 81-130; Dworkin, supra note 26, at 43-44.
33 William A. Edmundson, Three Anarchical Fallacies: An Essay on Political Authority 7-70 (1998).
34 Plato, Dialogues of Plato 50 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1900).
35 Id. at 49.






   
  
  
    








   
    
   
   





    
   
   
  
    
                                                 
  
   
 
        
 
275Binder — Why Law Matters
disagree with a particular judgment. This was Socrates’s defense, that his seemingly sub-
versive practice of philosophy reinforced the authority of the laws, which were grounded
in reason. To evade the law’s judgment by escaping would therefore belie his defense, and
absolve his judges of fault in misapplying the law, by implying they had no duty to follow
it in the first place.36 
Like Socrates, Kant reconciled fidelity to law with morality by using law’s virtues
of consistency and impartiality as a model for morality. Kant certainly did not think we
exercise moral autonomy by doing whatever we want. Kantian moral autonomy requires
subjecting ourselves to fair rules. The moral agent chooses these rules by imagining and
evaluating a community in which everyone acts as he does. In other words, Kantian 
morality requires that the agent imagine uniformly applied laws and then live by them.
Kant’s ethic of impartiality is reminiscent of Rousseau’s concept of the general will that
would enable individuals to transcend their individuality and enact legitimate law. Kant
reasoned that if communities could subject themselves to law democratically, individuals
could assume moral obligations autonomously in the same way.
Modern philosophers have offered at least six kinds of arguments for the legiti-
macy of some kinds of government.37 Three are primarily concerned with why
government is a good thing:
(1) Public Welfare Arguments: It is collectively rational to institute government in so
far as necessary to overcome the epistemic, collective action and coordination problems
preventing individuals from cooperating to achieve various public goods.
(2) Natural Necessity Arguments : Human beings are naturally disposed to live in groups, 
affect one another’s interests, compete for resources, power and status, and choose lead-
ers. Political power of some kind is inevitable, and uncertain or divided power leads to 
violent contestation.38 The challenge of holding power often induces leaders to mobilize
attacks on less organized populations. Anarchy and war are so miserable that there is a 
need to form governments, and civil war is so miserable that there is a presumptive need
to preserve tolerably just established governments.
(3) Moral Good Arguments: Government can be a useful or even a necessary means
of fulfilling moral obligations people owe one another and should recognize. Such obliga-
tions could be of mutual protection or aid; of distributive, corrective or retributive justice;
or of enabling fair participation in collective choices that will affect them.
The next three arguments are more concerned with why this need for government
is our problem—why it imposes any duties of obedience on us:
36 Id. at 52.
37 See generally Simmons, supra note 2; Edmundson, supra note 33, at 7-70; Greene, supra note 3, at 35-
113.








    
  
   
   
   
  
  
   
      
    
  
   
  
   
   
  
  







   
    
 
 
   
  
276 Critical Analysis of Law 2:2 (2015)
(4) Fair Play Arguments :  Individuals who assert rights under law are fairly obliged
to respect the rights of others under law. More controversially, individuals who benefit
from the public goods enabled by general compliance with law are fairly obliged to coop-
erate in producing those goods by complying. This includes everyone, if those public
goods include care during the substantial periods of our lives when we are dependent.
Similarly, individuals who participate in competitive collective decision processes are fairly
obliged to accept the results, win or lose.
(5) Sociability Arguments: People who regularly interact and affect one another argu-
ably have a duty of mutual aid. Cooperative social interaction reduces mistrust and
consequent conflict and insecurity. Frequent associates have more information about one
another’s needs and lower costs to provide aid. When one’s associates commit to a com-
mon project, assisting them expresses that one values the association. These duties of
sociability provide a reason to comply with the particular cooperative schemes accepted
by one’s associates, even if other cooperative schemes would be as beneficial or more so.
(6) Consent Arguments : Presumably, government is legitimate to the extent those sub-
ject to it accept its authority—which many do. Government might have to meet certain
conditions of justice for such consent to count as rational, or to be compatible with the
continuing autonomy of the governed.
These arguments are contingent and cumulative. Together, they encourage our
obedience to law in so far as it suppresses anarchy and civil war, serves other public or
moral goods, is obeyed and valued by our associates, is tolerably stable and just, and we
personally benefit from and consent to it.
How do Harel’s ideas fit into our taxonomy of arguments for legal obligation?
Basically, they fit into the third category. Thus, Harel claims that individuals deserve to be
publicly recognized and treated as subjects of rights, and this moral good requires a liberal
state governed by a rule of law. Yet Harel’s reasoning implies not only that law and gov-
ernment are moral goods, but also that individuals are morally obliged to obey and accept
the authority of at least some laws. Thus, if individuals deserved recognition and treat-
ment as subjects of publicly conferred rights not only by officials, but also by other
individuals, then each of us would have a moral duty not only to avoid infringing such
rights, but also to respect them as law. 
V. Arguments Against Legal Obligation 
To see the significance of Harel’s argument for a duty to respect our fellows as subjects of
legal rights, it is useful to work through Simmons’s influential arguments against legal ob-
ligation.
Simmons rejects public welfare arguments by reasoning that the obedience or
disobedience of any individual can neither achieve nor frustrate the achievement of a pub-
lic good. Since such goods depend on widespread compliance, no individual can make a




















   
  









                                                 
  




     
  
277Binder — Why Law Matters
difference.39 Thus no one can have a duty to obey law by virtue of having a duty to cause
or maximize the good.
Yet if one has a duty to seek, promote, facilitate, encourage or cooperate in 
achieving the good, a different conclusion might be reached. Accomplice liability attrib-
utes liability for contributing to wrongs in this way without causing them.40 Similarly,
compliance with cooperative schemes makes one “complicit” in the achievement of 
goods one has not caused.
Simmons would respond that any vague duty of promoting the good could be
pursued in a variety of ways and so could never dictate obedience to any particular law.41 
And since those other ways of pursuing the good might turn out to be better, the morally
autonomous person must eschew any commitment to a particular means for promoting
the good in favor of fidelity to the good itself.42 
If a duty to achieve the good cannot ground a duty to cooperate in producing a
good, one might try to base such a duty on fair play or sociability. Simmons’s objection to 
a fair play argument is that it cannot apply to everyone, because some might not benefit
from or desire the creation of the public good.43 
This argument is usefully compared to Jeffrie Murphy’s critique of a fair play ac-
count of punishment. Herbert Morris had argued that offenders had a duty to suffer
punishment because they had received the benefits of law in the form of protection of
their persons and property, and cooperatively produced public goods like education and
environmental quality, without the burdens of compliance.44 Murphy pointed out that this
makes retributive justice contingent on distributive justice, and that many offenders are
likely to be victims of distributive injustice.45 This argument shows that a fair play duty to 
obey law is contingent on fair institutions, not that there can be no such duty.
Simmons’s objection to a duty of fair play is quite different. He objects to being
forced to play the game. Thus even in a distributively just society, an anarchist might ob-
ject to receiving the benefits of cooperation—presumably including protection of his
person and entitlements. If so, he should be entitled to provide his own security, pay no 
taxes, and obey no laws. Yet it seems odd for the anarchist to demand an entitlement to 
be free of coercion. Who has a duty to enforce or respect this entitlement, and how does
that duty arise? Simmons presumes that the anarchist has no moral duties to help realize
distributive justice because he can opt out of the game. But this requires the dubious as-
39 Simmons, supra note 2, at 124-27.
40 Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age 209-19 (2000).
41 Simmons, supra note 2, at 166-68.
42 Id. at 126.
43 Id. at 119-20.
44 Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 Monist 475 (1968). 













   








   
  





   
   
 
 
   
   
       
                                                 




278 Critical Analysis of Law 2:2 (2015)
sumption that there is someplace outside the playing field of social life, where obligations
of justice don’t apply because people have no effect on each other.
The argument from sociability asserts that people who interact or who share iden-
tification with a community appropriately feel a heightened sense of responsibility for one
another’s welfare. Simmons responds that such theories are reducible to either public wel-
fare or consent theories.46 Thus we should support our neighbors’ preferred legal norms
because that makes them happy, or our sociability provides a reason to think that consent
is widespread.
The argument from natural necessity offers a different ground for mutual respon-
sibility, insisting that humans cannot avoid competition and conflict over scarce and
common resources. Thus every individual’s entitlements are inevitably determined collec-
tively. We can determine these entitlements with a view to fairness, or welfare, or some
other value, but we cannot avoid determining them. Thus the obligations of distributive
justice cannot be avoided. Underlying the argument from natural necessity is the premise
that individual autonomy is a fiction—that we are naturally subject to society and that a 
measure of freedom is only possible by fashioning social arrangements into a sufficiently
fair and democratic rule of law.
Simmons has two responses to the argument from natural necessity that legal reg-
ulation of conflict is necessary. First, legal regulation of conflict might not be necessary
because resources and responsibilities could all be allocated by voluntary agreements.47 
Second, even if legal regulation of conflict is necessary, distributive justice is not. Gov-
ernment could fulfill its function of maintaining social peace by adopting and enforcing a
libertarian legal regime. Thus anarchists are not morally obliged by natural necessity to
accept anything beyond a minimal state. They might be obliged to obey laws against mur-
der, but not to pay taxes or minimum wages, or conserve carbon.48 
The proponent of legal obligation will respond to the first argument by noting
that human experience is that anarchy does not solve the problem of order or preclude
coercion. Voluntary agreements solve little if they are unenforceable. The response to the
second argument is that the minimal state is a distribution of entitlements affecting every-
one’s interests, not an alternative to enforcing a distribution. It is only a permissible
alternative to some more social democratic distribution if it is more just.
Simmons may object that the proponent of legal obligation has now shifted
from a natural necessity to a moral goods argument. Simmons offers two objections to
an obligation to achieve distributive justice that recapitulate his objections to a duty of
achieving public goods. First, if individual noncompliance makes no causal difference to
the efficacy of laws, the goal of achieving distributive justice cannot ground a duty of
46 Simmons, supra note 2, at 112-14; A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and
Obligations 65-92 (2001).
47 Simmons, supra note 2, at 133-34.
48 Id. at 136, 152.
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obedience.49 Second, a duty of distributive justice cannot ground a duty to support any
particular legal regime. Reasonable people will disagree on principles of distributive jus-
tice. Individuals might choose to fulfill their distributive obligations in a variety of ways.
The territorial jurisdictions determining the geographic scope of our legal obligations
are unlikely to line up with the geographic scope of our moral duties because their pop-
ulations are wider than the circle of association but narrower than the circle of people
affected by our actions.50 
Simmons regards all of the arguments considered thus far as identifying reasons to
enact and obey law, but not as establishing duties to do so. All of the reasons considered
are ones an autonomous moral agent might reject. The only sufficient ground for a duty
of obedience that Simmons recognizes is consent.
Very well, but if we are to credit legal theorists like Hart and social scientists like
Tyler, most people do accept the authority of law. It would seem—by Simmons’s own 
premises—that people who accept the authority of a legal regime for good reasons have a
duty to obey law.
Yet Simmons insists that hardly anyone consents to obey law. He supports this
startling claim, not by talking about attitudes and beliefs, but by talking about acts. Thus,
no true contracts were signed between the English and their sovereign, or among the
French citizenry at the conclusion of their revolutions. No actual agreement warrants the
difference principle. We cannot pledge allegiance to the constitution merely by remaining
within our borders, as Socrates did, or voting in elections, or—well, pledging allegiance— 
because all of this is constrained by circumstance and motivated by self-interest, and
could be insincere.51 
Consent, as Simmons uses the term, means not a mental attitude, but a formal
undertaking creating an institutional fact.52 Presumably, this is needed on the view that
a mere mental attitude cannot bind us if at some later point we change our mind. Per-
haps, although it seems that if we expected others to obey a law when it benefited us,
we are bound by fair play to obey it when it benefits others. Moreover, an attitude of
fidelity to law may not be easily changed, if it is rooted in an identity as a loyal citizen, or
an army veteran, or the subject of rights. Finally, even if we are no longer obligated by
consent we have withdrawn, that does not preclude our obligating ourselves by means
of continuing consent.
Yet Simmons would deny that a self-image as a law-abiding person—which is
what social scientists seem to mean by the authority of law—can be a true source of obli-
gation. It seems that much as we might want to, we cannot consent to the authority of law
49 Id. at 136, 169.
50 Id. at 161-68.
51 Id. at 116-20.
52 Id. at 117, 147.
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without exercising a preexisting Hohfeldian power to create a duty and a correlative
right.53 But, Simmons implies, we cannot already have such a power to authorize law’s
authority, unless we presuppose some still higher authority that can bind us to be bound.
VI. Why Why Law Matters Matters to Legal Obligation 
For Simmons, as for Wolff, any such authority is precluded by our moral autonomy. Yet
for Plato, Rousseau and Kant, the rational embrace of just laws is an exercise of autono-
my that makes political freedom possible. Harel’s insight is that political freedom is not
only a set of arrangements that manages the problems of scarce and common goods in a
tolerable way. It is also an identity, a legal status of personhood. This identity is a social
identity that protects us from harm and secures to us recognition as a rational subject
whose objections must be heard and who must be answered with reasons. At the same
time, a status of political freedom is a personal identity that we claim, and that we thereby
commit ourselves to recognize in others. In demanding that others treat us reasonably
according to law, we obligate ourselves to do the same.
It seems that many of Simmons’s arguments against political obligation are reduc-
ible to either a denial of collective responsibility for distributive justice, or a jaundiced
view of the cooperative pursuit of the common good as a threat to moral autonomy. Yet
in critiquing Kant’s account of the moral duty to subject oneself to law, Simmons also 
presumes that law can have only instrumental value. According to Simmons, the moral
good Kant attributes to law is simply protection against injury. But that purpose can be
achieved without law, as long as everyone refrains from injuring one another. Hence one
has no moral duty to one’s fellows to subject oneself to law:
Justice for Kant . . . consists in each person’s having that to which she has a legitimate
moral claim—physical security and “external freedom,” the resources necessary for pur-
suing a reasonable, just life, etc. Justice cannot (despite Kant’s occasional lapses) consist
of the institutional provision of these goods without the definition’s simply begging the
question at issue between Lockeans and Kantians. The Kantian claim must be rather the
empirical claim that institutional enforcement is the only way to genuinely secure people’s
legitimate claims. People are not entitled to any more than having their rights respected.
They are not entitled to having them respected in a certain way (e.g., . . .  institutionally).54 
This assertion that it can make no moral difference whether one’s physical security and 
access to resources are protected by law or by the indulgence of a slavemaster is precisely
what Harel denies, in asserting the intrinsic value of law. Legal rights secure not just mate-
rial goods, but one’s status as an equal and as a subject, to whom power must answer in
the discourse of reason. Kant required not only respect for moral autonomy, but also legal
recognition of moral autonomy. Our duty to recognize one another’s equal dignity as sub-
jects of rights is Why Law Matters for our moral obligations.
53 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J.
16, 30, 44-54 (1913).
54 Simmons, supra note 2, at 177 n.64.
